Genomic epidemiology of a protracted hospital outbreak caused by multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii in Birmingham, England by Halachev, Mihail R et al.
Halachev et al. Genome Medicine 2014, 6:70
http://genomemedicine.com/content/6/11/70RESEARCH Open AccessGenomic epidemiology of a protracted hospital
outbreak caused by multidrug-resistant
Acinetobacter baumannii in Birmingham, England
Mihail R Halachev1†, Jacqueline Z-M Chan2†, Chrystala I Constantinidou2, Nicola Cumley3, Craig Bradley3,
Matthew Smith-Banks3, Beryl Oppenheim3 and Mark J Pallen2*Abstract
Background: Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii commonly causes hospital outbreaks. However, within an
outbreak, it can be difficult to identify the routes of cross-infection rapidly and accurately enough to inform infection
control. Here, we describe a protracted hospital outbreak of multidrug-resistant A. baumannii, in which whole-genome
sequencing (WGS) was used to obtain a high-resolution view of the relationships between isolates.
Methods: To delineate and investigate the outbreak, we attempted to genome-sequence 114 isolates that had
been assigned to the A. baumannii complex by the Vitek2 system and obtained informative draft genome sequences
from 102 of them. Genomes were mapped against an outbreak reference sequence to identify single nucleotide
variants (SNVs).
Results: We found that the pulsotype 27 outbreak strain was distinct from all other genome-sequenced strains.
Seventy-four isolates from 49 patients could be assigned to the pulsotype 27 outbreak on the basis of genomic
similarity, while WGS allowed 18 isolates to be ruled out of the outbreak. Among the pulsotype 27 outbreak
isolates, we identified 31 SNVs and seven major genotypic clusters. In two patients, we documented within-host diversity,
including mixtures of unrelated strains and within-strain clouds of SNV diversity. By combining WGS and epidemiological
data, we reconstructed potential transmission events that linked all but 10 of the patients and confirmed links between
clinical and environmental isolates. Identification of a contaminated bed and a burns theatre as sources of transmission
led to enhanced environmental decontamination procedures.
Conclusions: WGS is now poised to make an impact on hospital infection prevention and control, delivering
cost-effective identification of routes of infection within a clinically relevant timeframe and allowing infection control
teams to track, and even prevent, the spread of drug-resistant hospital pathogens.Background
Acinetobacter baumannii is an important cause of noso-
comial infection, particularly ventilator-associated pneu-
monia and bloodstream infections in critically ill patients,
and has a tendency to cause hospital outbreaks [1,2].
Multidrug-resistant (MDR) and even pan-drug-resistant
strains have been reported worldwide [3]. It has also
emerged as a threat to casualties of the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, with the secondary problem that strains* Correspondence: m.pallen@warwick.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.introduced to hospitals by military personnel can cause
cross infection of staff and patients [4-9]. Although existing
molecular typing methods play an important role in identi-
fying outbreaks [10,11], they lack the resolution necessary
to identify chains and modes of transmission within out-
breaks and so can provide only limited guidance to infec-
tion control teams on how best to control or terminate an
outbreak.
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of bacterial isolates
provides a promising new method for investigating the
epidemiology of outbreaks, particularly when coupled
to clinical locational and temporal data [12-17]. Here,
we describe a protracted hospital outbreak which oc-
curred in Birmingham, England between July 2011 andal Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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bacter baumannii belonging to pulse-field gel electro-
phoresis type (pulsotype) 27. During the outbreak, we
used genome sequencing to obtain a high-resolution view
of the relationships between isolates, allowing us to recon-
struct chains of transmission, confirm or refute epidemio-
logical hypotheses and to provide the infection control
team with useful insights into the sources and routes of
infection during this outbreak.
Methods
Microbiological investigations
Here, we report a routine and clinically indicated infec-
tion control investigation into an outbreak, with no
experimentation on human subjects. No additional sam-
ples other than those that were clinically relevant were
taken from patients and the use of genome sequencing
falls under the remit of laboratory method development,
which does not need ethical approval. Multidrug-resistant
Acinetobacter (MDR-Aci) isolates were obtained from
routine clinical samples through culture on blood agar,
followed by single-colony isolation. Bacterial identification
and antibiotic susceptibility testing were performed in the
hospital microbiology laboratory on the Vitek 2 sys-
tem according to the manufacturer’s recommendations
(bioMérieux, Basingstoke, UK) [18]. Multidrug resistance
was defined as resistance to ≥3 classes of antibiotics
(quinolones, extended-spectrum cephalosporins, β-lactam/
β-lactamase inhibitor combinations, aminoglycosides and
carbapenems).
All MDR-Aci isolates from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital
Birmingham during the outbreak period (July 2011 to
February 2013) were considered for inclusion in the
study. During this period, 65 patients tested positive for
MDR-Aci in the clinical laboratory. Patients were num-
bered consecutively, based on the date of first isolation
of MDR-Aci. The initial MDR-Aci isolate from each pa-
tient was sent to the Laboratory of HealthCare Associ-
ated Infection in Colindale, London for speciation and
typing by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and
other molecular methods [10]. When the reference la-
boratory finds that two or more isolates from the UK
share a novel PFGE pattern, the isolates are assigned to
a new numerical pulsotype, for example, pulsotype 27
or pulsotype 29.
An attempt was made to propagate isolates from all
MDR-Aci-positive patients for genomic analysis. How-
ever, isolates from three patients (patients 15, 28 and 38)
were lost on sub-culture or contaminated, leaving us
with 74 genome-sequenced pulsotype 27 isolates from
58 patients. To examine within-host diversity, multiple
isolates were obtained from 13 patients from different
body sites and/or at different times. In addition, 18 isolates
from 15 patients that had been identified as A. baumanniicomplex by Vitek 2, but turned out not to belong to the
outbreak, were subjected to genome analysis, as were 10
environmental isolates and four control strains, which had
been subjected to prolonged subculture in the laboratory.
We also genome-sequenced the first pulsotype 27 isolate
from the UK (kindly supplied by Jane Turton at the La-
boratory of HealthCare Associated Infection), which was
recovered in 2006 from a patient that had recently under-
gone surgery in India.
Genomic and epidemiological investigation
Genomic DNA was extracted from 114 putative Acineto-
bacter isolates, applying Qiagen 100/G Genomic-tips to
5 to 10 mL of overnight culture. A barcoded fragment li-
brary was generated for each isolate using the Nextera
Sample Preparation and Nextera Index Kits (Illumina),
then sequenced on an Illumina MiSeq, using paired-end
(2 × 151 or 2 × 251) protocols, to give a minimum depth
of coverage of 10×. We implemented a filtering pipeline
that trimmed reads at both ends, removing adaptors and
bases with sequencing quality <20, and discarded all
reads that mapped to PhiX or that contained Ns or
where >20% of bases had a sequencing quality of <20.
The genome of an isolate from a patient early in the
outbreak (patient 6) was sequenced on two different se-
quencing platforms (454 FLX + and Illumina MiSeq),
then a hybrid assembly was created to provide a refer-
ence genome for the outbreak, using Newbler v2.6 [19].
This assembly consisted of 4,031,405 base pairs, with
160 contigs in total and 126 contigs >500 bp, with an
N50 for contigs >500 base pairs of 31,936 base pairs.
Five contigs (seq23, 67, 75, 100 and 128), comprising
77,648 base pairs/80 CDSs, were assigned to a cryptic
plasmid on the basis of read depth, patterns of absence
in some isolates and homology searches.
The outbreak reference genome was compared to all
the MDR-Aci genome sequences that were publically
available in May 2013, using the Average Nucleotide
Identity (ANI) approach to identify the closest genome-
sequenced strain [20,21]. Isolates were assigned to a spe-
cies on the basis of ANI to reference genomes [20,21].
For genotypic investigations of potential outbreaks, gen-
ome sequences were mapped to the relevant reference
genome using Bowtie 2 [22], with default parameters,
except that the reads were soft-clipped at the ends to
improve the alignment score (option –local).
SNV discovery procedure
After mapping each set of read data to the reference
genome as explained above, we processed with SAM-
tools v0.1.18 [23] (mpileup with default parameters, dis-
abling the probabilistic realignment for the computation
of base alignment quality, that is, we used option -B)
and filtered it using BCFtools v0.1.17-dev (using the
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root-mean-square mapping quality of 30, maximum read
depth of 10,000 and minimum distance to a gap of
150 bp, that is, approximately one read length). Using
custom scripts, we screened these SNV locations to
exclude some potentially spurious SNVs by retaining
only SNVs which are:
 not from SNV-dense regions - no more than three
SNVs in a 1,001 bp window centred on the SNV
location
 most likely not from repeat regions – coverage less
than twice the average isolate’s coverage and
 at least 150 bp from scaffold boundaries.
The alignments of the remaining variant loci were then
manually inspected to check quality. For all SNV loci with
coverage five-fold or less or with consensus <90%, we per-
formed PCR and Sanger sequencing as a SNV verification
step.
For isolates from the pulsotype 27 outbreak, we de-
fined a new major SNV genotype, with a numerical des-
ignation (1.0, 2.0 and so on) whenever isolates with the
same SNV profile were obtained from more than one
patient. Genotypes confined to single patients within the
outbreak were defined as minor genotypes and were
given serial numerical designations (1.1, 2.1, 2.2 and so on)
based on the closest relationship to a major genotype. All
sequences from this study are available under ENA Acces-
sion number PRJEB4735.
To reconstruct the most parsimonious set of transmis-
sion events, we used a custom-built algorithm and
script. We considered three modes of transmission: dir-
ect ward contact, where donor and recipient are on the
same ward at the same time; delayed ward contact,
where donor and recipient have been on the same ward
but not at the same time; and theatre contact, where
donor and recipient have received treatment in the same
operating theatre. In the latter two modes, we assumed
that MDR-Aci strains could survive in the hospital envir-
onment for up to 5 weeks [24].
Results
Description of the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27
outbreak and the outbreak strain
Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB) is a pub-
lic hospital with around 1,200 beds. British military cas-
ualties are usually repatriated here. In July 2011, we saw
the first case in a new MDR-Aci outbreak: a military pa-
tient, who had been admitted to the hospital after suffer-
ing a blast injury in Afghanistan. The outbreak strain was
identified in the clinical laboratory as an MDR-Aci show-
ing resistance to multiple classes of antimicrobial agent,
including aminoglycosides, fluoroquinolones, carbapenems,cephalosporins, carboxypenicillins and tetracycline. It was
variably sensitive to colistin. The reference laboratory iden-
tified it as A. baumannii and, using PFGE, assigned it to
pulsotype 27, a pulsotype not previously seen at QEHB.
Over the following 80 weeks, isolates of the outbreak
strain were recovered from an additional 51 patients,
including civilians and military casualties, spanning mul-
tiple wards (Figure 1). Isolates were assigned to the out-
break provisionally on the basis of antibiogram and
definitively on the basis of pulsotype. However, after we
began to apply WGS to putative MDR-Aci isolates in
week 40 of the outbreak (April 2012), we also used gen-
ome sequence information to determine which isolates
belonged to the outbreak. Analysis of a reference gen-
ome for the outbreak, created from an early outbreak
isolate (isolate 6), revealed that the outbreak strain was
distinct from all other well-characterised strains, includ-
ing strains from previous outbreaks in local hospitals
and clusters with other strains in a previously defined,
widespread clonal lineage, International Clone I. A com-
parison with the first British pulsotype 27 isolate, which
had been identified by the Laboratory of HealthCare
Associated Infection in 2006, showed over 1,200 SNVs,
ruling out any close relationship between our 2011 to
2013 outbreak and this historical isolate.
To delineate and investigate the outbreak, we attempted
to genome-sequence 114 isolates identified as A. bau-
mannii complex by the Vitek 2 system and obtained in-
formative draft genome sequences from 102 of them.
Seventy-four clinical isolates, obtained from 52 patients
(including the index case), and 10 environmental iso-
lates showed sufficient genomic similarity to the out-
break reference strain (≤8 SNVs different) to be ruled
into the outbreak (Table 1).
Genomics reveals clusters of infection
We identified 31 SNVs in outbreak isolates (Table 2).
These SNVs, together with presence/absence of a cryp-
tic plasmid (that is, a 77-kb plasmid with no obvious
phenotype), define seven major outbreak genotypes,
which fall into a phylogenetic relationship consistent with
the timeline of the outbreak (Figure 2). Most of the major
genotypes in the outbreak are accompanied by a cloud of
one or two SNV variants in a wheel-and-spokes configur-
ation, so that in total there are 32 distinct genotypes of the
outbreak strain (Table 1, Figure 2). Laboratory subculture
controls, including two different colonies picked after four
serial subcultures and a culture that had been subjected to
seven freeze-thaw cycles, all had the same SNV genotype
as a minimally passaged parent culture, suggesting that
SNVs are not readily acquired in the laboratory.
Among the outbreak genomes, we found two protein-
coding genes that contained more than one SNV. Four
non-synonymous SNVs were identified in the same sensor
ab
Figure 1 (See legend on next page.)
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Figure 1 Chronology of the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak in Birmingham, UK, 2011 to 2013, showing ward
occupancy and other events for 52 patients. (a) The first phase of the outbreak, up to week 70. (b) A detailed view of the second phase of
the outbreak, after week 70. Vertical bars indicate samples positive for MDR-Aci. The coloured horizontal bars indicate ward occupancy by patients
carrying MDR-Aci. Patients are ordered by the SNV genotype of their MDR-Aci isolates, with major genotypes delineated by rectangles. Ward 1
cares mainly for burns and trauma patients; Ward 2 cares mainly for cardiac surgery patients, Ward 3 cares mainly for trauma patients; Ward 4 for
plastic, ear-nose-and-throat, maxillofacial, trauma patients. * The first of three isolates obtained from patient 30 was not genome-sequenced.
° Patient 32 visited Ward 1 for 12 hours.
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resistance [25]. None of these SNVs match known colistin
resistance-associated mutations. However, three of the
changes occur in isolates (1b, 34e and 23) that show de-
creased susceptibility to colistin (MIC 256 mg/L), suggest-
ing that they might represent new resistance-associated
mutations. Isolates that share the fourth SNV in pmrB,
which delineates patient 22 from Genotype 2.0 and also
occurs in Genotypes 3.0-7.0, retain sensitivity to colistin
(MIC ≤8 mg/L).
Non-outbreak isolates, within-host diversity and mixed
infections
Genome sequencing revealed that 18 Acinetobacter iso-
lates, although obtained from hospitalised patients
during the study period, did not belong to the main
outbreak. A close genomic relationship between four iso-
lates, twinned with a 3-week overlap in ward occupancy,
provided evidence of a second small outbreak of MDR-
Aci, which from PFGE results on three of the isolates
could be assigned to pulsotype 29 (Table 3). Similarly,
genome comparisons established that seven isolates ob-
tained from five patients were members of the related
species, Acinetobacter pittii, but very large pair-wise dif-
ferences (>20,000 SNVs) between A. pittii isolates from
different patients ruled out cross-infection.
From one trauma patient (patient 26), who was hospi-
talised for over 7 months, we genome-sequenced seven
isolates of MDR-Aci obtained from different anatomical
sites over a 4-month period and found five SNV variants
(Figure 2):
 The initial isolate, 26a, which was obtained from
a sputum sample, falls one SNV away from
Genotype 4.0.
 A blood isolate (26b) taken 8 days later falls within
Genotype 4.0.
 Isolates 26c/d/f, obtained from a series of CSF
samples taken approximately 3 months later, fall one
SNV away from 26a
 A second sputum isolate (26e) represents a unique
one-SNV variant of genotype 4.0.
Retrieval of a cloud of genotypes from a single pa-
tient illustrates the potential for within-host evolution inMDR-Aci, mirroring findings with other hospital patho-
gens such as Staphylococcus aureus [26,27].
From yet another CSF sample from patient 26, we iso-
lated a strain of MDR-Aci that was shown to be distinct
from the outbreak strain by PFGE typing and by genome
sequencing, providing evidence of double infection. We
also found evidence of double infection with Acinetobacter
in another trauma patient, patient 44, where two isolates,
each from a separate wound swab taken on the same day,
were identified by genome sequencing as A. pittii and the
outbreak strain of A. baumannii.
Routes and chains of transmission within the main
MDR-Aci outbreak
We reconstructed transmission events, assuming the
most parsimonious transmission paths between patients.
Using conventional epidemiological information alone,
we identified 273 potential transmission events - an
average of approximately five per patient - that might
link patients within the outbreak. When genome se-
quence data were included, we were able to reduce this
to a set of 57 potential transmission events. This set
linked all but 10 of the pulsotype 27 patients and, in
most cases, provided a single most-parsimonious trans-
mission event that explained how a patient acquired the
outbreak strain (Table 4).
Early in the outbreak, epidemiological and genomic
analyses indicated that transmission occurred primarily
as a result of cross-infection between patients located on
the same ward at the same time. Thus, all isolates from
Genotypes 1.0 and 2.0 and most of the isolates from
Genotype 4.0 came from patients who had stayed on the
Ward 1. In some cases, long-term contamination of the
ward environment was thought to account for transmis-
sion and this was confirmed by environmental swabbing
in side rooms after patients had been discharged and the
room cleaned (Table 1). For example, isolate E1 was re-
covered a day after patient 44 was discharged; genomic
analyses revealed it shared the same SNV profile (Geno-
type 6.0) as four of the five MDR-Aci isolates from that
patient. Similarly isolates E2-4 were taken a day after pa-
tient 55 was discharged and were found to show a one-
SNV difference from a patient 55 isolate. In both cases,
the patients suffered severe burns and each stayed in a
single room for the entire hospital stay. Confirmation of
Table 1 Description of 52 patients and 84 isolates associated with the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak
in Birmingham, England, 2011 to 2013
Patient no. or
environmental source
Length of hospital
stay (days)
Isolate
no.
Time of isolation (days) Genotype SNVs/plasmid loss
(p indicates loss of plasmid)
From admission From start of
outbreak
1 231 1a 3 3 1.0 0
1b 21 21 1.1 1,p
2 24 2 7 12 1.0 0
4 88 4 25 36 2.1 2,4,p
6 29 6 6 42 2.0 2
7 422 7 3 55 1.2 3
8 23 8 9 56 2.0 2
9 83 9 52 60 2.2 2,7
10 15 10 65 65 2.3 2,7,10,11
11 99 11 11 65 2.0 2
12 39 12 6 73 2.0 2
13 62 13 3 81 1.0 0
14 77 14 24 87 3.0 2,6
15 LOST: not included in transmission analysis
16 31 16 12 90 1.0 0
17 535 17 24 94 2.0 2
18 15 18 2 97 3.0 2,6
19 58 19 19 123 3.0 2,6
20 49 20a 12 135 4.0 2,5,9
20b 13 136 4.0 2,5,9
21 19 21 1 138 4.0 2,5,9
22 84 22 31 144 2.4 2,5
23 45 23 10 147 2.5 2,5,8
24 218 24a 25 165 4.0 2,5,9
24b 194 334 4.10 2,5,9,12,p
25 19 25 8 180 5.0 2,5,9,p
26 197 26a 17 180 4.1 2,5,9,13
26b 25 188 4.0 2,5,9
26c 100 263 4.2 2,5,9,13,22,p
26d 100 263 4.2 2,5,9,13,22,p
26e 102 265 4.6 2,5,9,14
26f 102 265 4.2 2,5,9,13,22,p
27 82 27a 13 209 4.0 2,5,9
27b 19 215 4.3 2,5,9,15
27c 21 217 4.0 2,5,9
28 114 28a 31 227 LOST: mixed culture
28b 43 239
28c 61 257
29 64 29* 83 227 (GP) 5.0 2,5,9,p
30 23 30a 10 237 4.0 2,5,9
30b 13 240 4.0 2,5,9
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Table 1 Description of 52 patients and 84 isolates associated with the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak
in Birmingham, England, 2011 to 2013 (Continued)
Patient no. or
environmental source
Length of hospital
stay (days)
Isolate
no.
Time of isolation (days) Genotype SNVs/plasmid loss
(p indicates loss of plasmid)
From admission From start of
outbreak
31 66 31a 37 235 4.0 2,5,9
31b 37 235 MIXED
31c 39 237 4.4 2,5,9,18
31d 39 237 LOST: mixed culture
31e 39 237 Escherichia coli
31f 39 237 LOST: mixed culture
31g 39 237 LOST: mixed culture
31h 39 237 LOST: mixed culture
31i 46 244 4.5 2,5,9,17
31j 58 256 4.0 2,5,9
31k 64 297 Pseudomonas aeruginosa
32 16 32 4 240 5.0 2,5,9,p
34 107 34a 14 284 4.7 2,5,9,19
34b 15 285 4.0 2,5,9
34c 15 285 4.0 2,5,9
34d 15 285 4.0 2,5,9
34e 26 296 4.8 2,5,9,20
34f 27 297 4.9 2,5,9,28
38 96 38 39 298 LOST
39 9 39 4 308 6.1 2,5,9,16,23
40 53 40a 11 334 6.0 2,5,9,16
40b 13 336 6.0 2,5,9,16
43 60 43 29 383 6.0 2,5,9,16
44 15 44a 8 390 6.0 2,5,9,16
44b 9 391 6.0 2,5,9,16
44c 11 391 6.2 2,5,9,16,24
44e 11 393 6.0 2,5,9,16
44f 11 393 6.0 2,5,9,16
Ward 1 post-patient 44 E1 397 6.0 2,5,9,16
49 49 49a 21 406 6.0 2,5,9,16
49b 33 418 5.0 2,5,9,p
50 50 50 14 437 6.0 2,5,9,16
51 96 51 14 440 6.0 2,5,9,16
52 24 52 13 495 6.0 2,5,9,16
53 26 53 6 506 4.11 2,5,9,21,p
54 37 54 30 507 6.0 2,5,9,16
55 47 55 25 510 6.0 2,5,9,16
Burns Unit shower head post-patient 55 E2 532 5.0 2,5,9,p
Burns Unit shower chair post-patient 55 E3 532 5.0 2,5,9,p
Burns Unit patient chair post-patient 55 E4 532 5.0 2,5,9,p
57 12 57 5 533 6.0 2,5,9,16
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Table 1 Description of 52 patients and 84 isolates associated with the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak
in Birmingham, England, 2011 to 2013 (Continued)
Patient no. or
environmental source
Length of hospital
stay (days)
Isolate
no.
Time of isolation (days) Genotype SNVs/plasmid loss
(p indicates loss of plasmid)
From admission From start of
outbreak
Touch screen burns theatre post-patient 57 E5 538 7.0 2,5,9,16,26,29
Anaesthetic machine burns theatre post-patient 57 E6 538 7.0 2,5,9,16,26,29
Pat Slide burns theatre post-patient 57 E7 538 6.4 2,5,9,16,26
Stool burns theatre post-patient 57 E8 538 6.4 2,5,9,16,26
Scissors burns theatre post-patient 57 E9 538 6.5 2,5,9,16,27
ECG leads burns theatre post-patient 57 E10 538 7.0 2,5,9,16,26,29
58 72 58 6 535 6.3 2,5,9,16,25
59 29 59 9 538 7.1 2,5,9,16,26,29,30,p
60 36 60 19 538 5.0 2,5,9,p
61 15 61 9 542 7.0 2,5,9,16,26,29
62 27 62 4 543 7.0 2,5,9,16,26,29
63 29 63 15 544 7.2 2,5,9,16,26,29,31
64 8 64 4 554 6.0 2,5,9,16
65 15 65 2 556 6.0 2,5,9,16
Patients were assigned to the outbreak if an initial isolate was shown by PFGE to belong to pulsotype 27. For three patients (15, 28, 38), no MDR-Aci isolates were
available for genome sequencing.
*Isolate 29 was obtained after discharge from hospital from a sample provided by a general practitioner (GP).
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tightening of ward decontamination procedures.
Some outbreak strain acquisitions could not be ex-
plained simply by within-ward transmission, so we
were forced to consider alternative routes of infection.
As the outbreak progressed, we noticed that most of
the affected patients made numerous visits to operat-
ing theatres: only five were never treated in an operat-
ing theatre. One particular theatre, specializing in the
treatment of burns patients, was implicated in trans-
mission between patient 34 (donor) and patients 40
and 39 (recipients). Consequently, in week 46 the burns
theatre was closed and underwent deep cleaning (that
is, decluttering of the operating theatre, followed by
cleaning of all patient-associated equipment, non-fixed
items, horizontal surfaces, walls, ceilings, ventilation
shafts and storage areas with a chlorine-based disin-
fectant). Although there were several ward-based trans-
mission events in the weeks that followed, no new
theatre-acquired cases were observed for the subse-
quent 6 weeks and, for a time, the outbreak appeared to
have ended.
Unfortunately, the outbreak resumed when a burns
patient, patient 52, presented with an isolate from
Genotype 6.0 in week 70. Initial epidemiological investiga-
tions failed to find any plausible direct ward- or theatre-
based route of transmission that might link patient 52
with earlier outbreak cases. However, our finding ofgenotypic identity between the patient 52 isolate and pre-
vious outbreak isolates forced us to perform a more thor-
ough epidemiological investigation, which uncovered a
vehicle for transmission: patient 52 had occupied a specia-
lised burns care bed that had been previously occupied by
another Genotype 6.0 patient, patient 50. This prompted
the development of a decontamination protocol for this
specialised type of bed.
The outbreak spread to over a dozen new patients dur-
ing the subsequent 9 weeks. Our suspicion once again
focused on the burns theatre as the likely source of in-
fection. This was confirmed when we obtained six iso-
lates (E5-10) from environmental swabs of the burns
operating theatre. All isolates from this phase of the out-
break, from patients and the environment, belonged to,
or were closely related to, Genotypes 6.0 and 7.0. These
findings prompted a second closure of the burns theatre,
with deep cleaning in week 76. Following this second
deep clean of the theatre the outbreak ceased and no
further acquisitions of the strain were identified. The
outbreak was formally declared closed in May 2013
when no inpatients were colonised or infected with the
outbreak strain and there had been no new acquisitions
for a period of 12 weeks.
Discussion
Like many other hospitals, QEHB suffers from serial
clonal outbreaks of MDR-Aci, which result from the
Table 2 Genomic locations and other details of 31 single nucleotide variants (SNVs) detected in the genomes of
isolates from the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak in Birmingham, UK, 2011 to 2013
SNV no. Location in reference
assembly
Orthologue annotation Amino acid Codon (residue in bold) Orthologue
Original New Original New
1 2354692 Two-component sensor kinase
transcription regulator protein PmrB
Pro Leu CCA CTA AB57_3172
2 1696968 Diguanylate cyclase Lys STOP AAA TAA AB57_0627
3 219628 16S rRNA methyltransferase GidB Arg Ser CGT AGT AB57_1794
4 2953356 3-oxoacyl-ACP reductase Leu Trp TTG TGG AB57_0871
5 2354857 Two-component sensor kinase
transcription regulator protein PmrB
Thr Ile ACT ATT AB57_3172
6 164435 Adenylate/guanylate cyclase Asp Gly GAC GGC AB57_1850
7 164513 Adenylate/guanylate cyclase Tyr Phe TAT TTT AB57_1850
8 2354642 Two-component sensor kinase
transcription regulator protein PmrB
Thr Pro ACC CCC AB57_3172
9 2568699 Threonine synthase Leu Leu TTA CTA AB57_0327
10 555356 Catalase/peroxidase HPI Leu Ile TTA ATA AB57_0488
11 2961444 AraC family transcriptional regulator Val Val GTC GTT AB57_1179
12 48566 LysR family transcriptional regulator Leu Ile CTC ATC AB57_1964
13 1778342 Lysine/ornithine N-monooxygenase BasC Trp STOP TGG TAG A1S_2384
14 1600195 Bifunctional cyclohexadienyl
dehydrogenase/ 3-phosphoshikimate
1-carboxyvinyltransferase
Gly Ser GGT AGT AB57_2630
15 3658279 Non-coding Intergenic 88 bp from
start of serB
16 2448345 Plasmid replicase protein His Tyr CAC TAC ACINIS123_A0022
17 706757 Putative transport protein Ala Thr GCT ACT ABAYE2100
18 3286974 ABC transporter ATP-binding protein Gly Cys GGT TGT ABAYE2100
19 2501364 Regulatory helix-turn-helix protein, lysR
family protein
Val Ile GTA ATA ABBFA_001413
20 2354659 Two-component sensor kinase
transcription regulator protein PmrB
Arg Leu CGC CTC AB57_3172
21 2720233 Non-coding intergenic 72 bp from
start of kdsD
22 3818799 Argininosuccinate synthase Val Val GTT GTA AB57_1152
23 727482 Oxidoreductase short-chain
dehydrogenase/reductase family
Leu Leu CTA CTT AB57_2417
24 2153319 Diguanylate cyclase/phosphodiesterase Tyr Asn TAC AAC AB57_2291
25 2879522 Glutathionylspermidine synthase Asp Glu GAT GAG HMPREF0022_00853
26 2055876 D-ala-D-ala-carboxypeptidase,
penicillin-binding protein
Thr Lys ACG AAG AB57_2923
27 2698063 D-and L-methionine ABC transporter
ATP-binding protein MetN
Arg Trp CGG TGG AB57_1716
28 1499950 Peptidase M20D, amidohydrolase Glu Gly GAA GGA AB57_2996
29 396513 Non-coding intergenic 80 bp from
start of TetR/AcrR
transcriptional regulators
30 2371782 Hypothetical protein Val Ala GTT GCT ACIN5074_3260
31 1935255 Hypothetical protein Arg His CGT CAT AB57_1009
Orthologue designations are taken from the completed genome of Acinetobacter baumannii AB0057 (GenBank Accession CP001182). Coding sequences in which
more than one SNV occurs are highlighted in bold.
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Figure 2 Genotypes obtained from 84 isolates from the Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak in Birmingham, UK, 2011 to
2013, including 74 clinical isolates from 49 patients and 10 environmental isolates. Numbers in red represent SNVs; ‘p’ indicates loss of
plasmid; isolates in italics are plasmid-negative; dotted lines indicate alternative phylogenetic links (plasmid loss then SNV acquisition versus SNV
acquisition then plasmid loss).
Table 3 Acinetobacter isolates from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, England cultured between July 2011
and February 2013 that do not belong to Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27
Patient no. Length of hospital
stay (days)
Isolate no. Time of isolation (days) Species Pulsotype SNV genotype
After admission From start of outbreak
3 72 3 21 13 A. baumannii 3 Unrelated
5 22 5 2 27 A. baumannii Unique Unrelated
26 197 26 g 102 265 A. baumannii Not typed Unrelated
37 25 37 3 291 A. baumannii Not typed Unrelated
41 72 41 10 371 A. baumannii 13 Unrelated
45 35 45 57 394 A. baumannii Unique Unrelated
47 48 47 13 401 A. baumannii 29 Related
48 167 48 10 404 A. baumannii 29 Related
46 33 46a 5 396 A. baumannii 29 Related
46b 7 398 A. baumannii Not typed Related
56 21 56 18 531 A. baumannii 9 Unrelated
33 63 33 9 271 A. pittii Not typed Unrelated
35 205 35 1 286 A. pittii Not typed Unrelated
36 27 36 1 286 A. pittii Not typed Unrelated
42 72 42a, b, c 1 373 A. pittii Not typed Unrelated
44 15 44d 9 391 A. pittii Not typed Unrelated
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Table 4 Potential transmission events within the
Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak in
Birmingham, England, 2011 to 2013, reconstructed
using a parsimonious analysis of ward/theatre
occupancy and SNV genotype
Patient
no.
Predicted donor(s)
of infection
SNVs compared to
predicted donor(s)
Days between donor
and recipient(s)
1 Index case: a military patient repatriated from Afghanistan
2 1 0 0
4 1 3 0
6 1 1 0
7 1 1 0
8 6 0 0
9 Unknown
10 9 2 0
11 6 or 8 0,0 0
12 6 or 8 or 11 0,0,0 0
13 1 0 <14
14 6 or 8 or 11 or 12 1,1,1,1 0
15 Not included in transmission analysis: strain lost on subculture
16 13 0 0
17 11 or 12 0,0 0
18 11 or 17 1,1 0
19 18 or 11 or 17 0,1,1 0
20 11 2 <21
21 20 0 0
22 Unknown
23 11 2 <35
24 20 0 0
25 22 or 24 2,1(loss of plasmid)
26 20 or 24 0,0 0
27 26 0 0
28 Not included in transmission analysis: mixed culture
29 20 or 24 1,1(loss of plasmid) 0
30 27 0 0
31 27 or 30 0,0 0
32 30 or 31 1,1(loss of plasmid) 0
34 31 0 <14
38 Not included in transmission analysis: not genome-sequenced
39 34 2 Theatre (same day)
40 34 1 Theatre (same day)
43 34 1 <7
44 43 0 <21
49 44 0 0
50 Unknown
51 Unknown
52 Outbreak restarts after patient 52 nursed on bed previously
used by patient 50
Table 4 Potential transmission events within the
Acinetobacter baumannii pulsotype 27 outbreak in
Birmingham, England, 2011 to 2013, reconstructed
using a parsimonious analysis of ward/theatre
occupancy and SNV genotype (Continued)
53 Unknown
54 Unknown
55 54 0 Theatre (1 day gap)
57 50 0 <21
58 57 1 0
59 57 2 0
60 54 1 (loss of plasmid) <14
61 57 2 Theatre (4 day gap)
62 57 2 0
63 62 1 0
64 57 0 <14
65 64 0 0
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tients [7-9]. We have described a prolonged outbreak of
MDR-Aci, in which bacterial WGS provided a powerful
adjunct to conventional laboratory and epidemiological
investigations. In so doing, we have built on our previ-
ous smaller-scale efforts on the genomic epidemiology of
A. baumannii [7] and on the work of others on a poly-
clonal outbreak genome-sequenced using the 454 plat-
form [28]. However, we have now benefited from the
improved ease of use, cost-effectiveness, throughput and
accuracy of the Illumina MiSeq platform. Unlike a recent
epidemiological analysis of MDR-Aci in a US hospital
[29]. We have focused on a single clonal outbreak and
have used a whole-genome SNV-based analysis twinned
with loss or gain of a plasmid to reconstruct strain evo-
lution as the outbreak progressed.
We have shown that this particular pathogen, Aci-
netobacter baumannii, undergoes sufficiently rapid
genome evolution within a hospital outbreak to allow
SNV analyses to reveal modes and routes of transmis-
sion and distinguish between alternate transmission
scenarios. When we combined evidence from over 30
genotypes with conventional epidemiological data, we
were able to identify the sources of several unexplained
transmission events and target additional investigations
and infection-control interventions to reduce the risk
of further transmission.
In this study, we were able to link patient-derived
isolates directly to environmental isolates. Early in the
outbreak, confirmation of contamination of the patients’
surroundings on the ward led to a tightening of ward
disinfection procedures. Later, WGS showed that envir-
onmental isolates from a burns operating theatre were
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theatre, followed by deep cleaning. Previous reports have
highlighted that burns patients are particularly at risk of
infection with Acinetobacter baumannii and that burns
units are susceptible to outbreaks and have also impli-
cated contaminated mattresses in infection [30,31].
We have demonstrated that there is considerable
genotypic diversity within patient-associated and envir-
onmental populations of Acinetobacter. We discovered
two examples of what were clearly mixed infections,
where more than one species or strain of Acinetobacter
was present in serial samples from the same site. In
addition, when we genome-sequenced multiple isolates
from multiple samples from a chronically infected pa-
tient, we found that the individual was carrying a cloud
of variants of the outbreak strain, rather than a single
SNV genotype. It remains unclear whether such geno-
typic diversity evolves in situ or whether multiple geno-
types are acquired serially or en masse. Although some
have suggested that such genotypic diversity precludes
the reconstruction of transmission events from genomic
data [32], the congruence and consistency we and others
[12] see between genotypic and epidemiologic data in
such analyses confirm the utility of such approaches.
However, the presence of such genotypic diversity in
pathogen populations challenges the long held practice
of picking and propagating a single example of each co-
lonial morphotype from a primary culture and suggests
a role for metagenomic approaches that might capture
bacterial genetic heterogeneity directly from the clinical
sample without culture [33-35].
Although, in this study, WGS was initially largely
retrospective, in the latter part of the outbreak, we were
able to go from colony to SNV genotype in less than 1
week. Local WGS thus allowed us to rule patients and
isolates in or out of the outbreak more quickly than
through the reference laboratory. Excluding isolates
meant that we could focus our efforts on determining
the connections between genetically related cases, rather
than trying to connect all cases of MDR-Aci.Conclusions
WGS is now poised to make an impact on hospital in-
fection prevention and control, delivering cost-effective
identification of routes of infection within a clinically
relevant timeframe and allowing infection control teams
to track, and even prevent, the spread of drug-resistant
hospital pathogens.Abbreviations
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